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Heidegger claims that truth is a revealing that is concomitant with
concealing, and thus, the nature oftruth is "untruth." In art, and specifically
in painting. truth in its fun essence is "won" through the simultaneous
presentation to the observer of a revealing and a concealing. For Heidegger,
this simultaneous revealing and concealing occurs when the "world" of a
painting is revealed through a self-concealing medium. Photography is
another form of revealing through a self-concealing medium, and thus it
meets Heidegger's standards as a work of art.1 In addition. photography
seems to meet more effectively than painting Heidegger's characterization
of a work of art, and one can argue on this basis that photography has
rendered painting archaic and outdated as means for attaining truth in the
Heideggerlan sense. Contrary to this argument, Michael Zimmerman claims
that Heidegger condemns photography as a false and anthropocentric means
of representation. Heldegger's condemnation, however, fails to conceive
the. nature of photography in light of Heidegger's own philosophy of
technology, and when photography is examined in such a light, this
condemnation of photography appears misleading.

Truth and Art
Truth in Heidegger's philosophy is unconcealedness. and Heideg
ger likens truth to a kind oflighting by which beings are revealed. With each
being that is revealed, however, another being is concealed. As Heidegger
states, "Concealment. .. occurs within what it lighted. One being places
itself in front of another being, the one helps to hide another. the former
obscures the latter" (OW A, p. 175), Because truth is revealing, and because
all revealing involves a conceaJing, Hcidegger claims that "[trufu] in its
essence, is un-truth" (OWA, p, 176), Heldegger further illustrates the
essence of truth as a "primal strife" in which beings reveal and conceal
I It sbould be noted that here and throughout the paper, I will be using the term
"photograpby" to mean "representational photography." !realize that with advancements in
the technology of film development, one can create very abstract photos that bear very little
semblance to reality.
"
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themselves. It is through the representation ofthis "primal strife" that truth
can "happen" or be "won,.' and inhis essay entitled "The Origin ofthe Work
of Art," Heidegger demonstrates how such a representation is possible in art.
In setting out his argument in the essay, Heidegger first considers
art's "thingly" nature. He asserts that because there is no one human
interpretation of the nature of things that is applicable to art, the "thingl y"
character of an artwork should be viewed as indeterminate. In order to
understand the "thingly" nature of a work of art, Heidegger believes that aU
traditional interpretations ofthe nature ofthings should be held in abeyance
in favor of an investigation that examines the "Being of beings." Such an
investigation should examine art merely as it presents itself and focus on
what Heidegger calls "[art] work's worldy nature" (OWA, p. 166). Only
through such an investigation can one discover the essence of art, and when
this essence is understood, one may then return to the question of the
undetermined, "thingly" nature of art. 1be investigation ofthe essence of art
must therefore presuppose that the nature of things is indeterminate.
After making this presupposition, Heidegger begins expl aining the
way that art "works" by introducing the concepts of world and earth. World
corresponds to revealing, and a world is the social and historical realm of
reality that is revealed by a work of art. The world of an art work creates in
the mind of the observer a broad range of possible decisions and scenarios
in what Heidegger calls uthe destiny of a historical people" (OWA, p. 172).
Though world is non-objective, it defines the very being in which we
conceive the objects of a work of art to exist.
Earth, on the other hand, corresponds to concealing and is what
Heidegger calls "that which rises up as self-closing" (OW A, p. 177). Though
Heideggerdoesnotexplicltlylinktheindeterminateconceptof"thingUncss"
with the idea of a self-concealing earth, Sandra Lee Bartky argues that
Heldegger's confusing language hides a subtle yet crucialllnk betwccn the
two concepts. Bartky claims that just as the nature ofa thing is indeterminate,
the earth is self-concealing and ambiguous. The nature of earth,like that of
all things, can not be fully defined either as a Scientifically allalyzablc
substance or as a useful piece ofequipment (Bartky. p. 260). As Heidegger
states, earth is neither "a mass of matter deposited somewhere [nor] the
merely astronomical idea of planet" (OWA, p. 167). Bartky believes that
Heldegger is indirectly yet primarily concerned with the thingly aspect of a
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work of art when he refers to earth in "The Origin of the Work of Art." In
addition. as Bartky notes, the concept of earth both encompasses and
supersedes the concept ofthingliness. Thingliness. whose nature is indeter
minate or concealed, is merely a part of "earth," which is ultimately the
larger concept of a "sheltering agent" or the self-concealing of Being in
general (OWA. p. 169). It does seem that Bartky is correct in thinking that
Heidegger conceives of a subtle yet crucial link between the concepts of
thingliness and earth simply because when one keeps this link in mind,
Heidegger's argument about the nature of art is much easier to understand.
For Heidegger, art is the simultaneous representation of the two
diametrically opposed forces of world and earth. World is presented in any
true work of art, and he states that "[to] be a work of art is to set up a world"
(OWA. p. 178). The world, however, can only be set up for the observer
through some klnd of medium or thing such as the pigments and colors of
a painting or the stone of a statue. When a thing is "examined" or analyzed
on its own, it is, like all other "things," undetermined and self-concealing.
Heidegger believes that a thing reveals its true nature only when all
preconceptions ofthingUness are dropped and one experiences the thing by
"letting it Be." Such a "letting Be" is accomplished in art simp1y because the
medium or "thingliness" of the art work is not analyzed by the observer. To
use Heidegger's example of the Greek temple, the rock which serves as the
material or "thingUness" of the temple, when analyzed on its own is seen as
equipment which can be used. Viewedinthis manner, therock, as Heidegger
states, "disappears into usefulness" (OWA, p. 171). But it is precisely in a
work of art, such as the Greek temple, that the rock is not viewed as a piece
of equipment. Rather, in the Greek temple, the rock is left to Be, and its true
nature, "the massi veness and heaviness ofstone," is revealed to the observer .
Similarly, in a painting the true nature of color "comes to shine forth." The
colors of a painting are not analyzed but rather simply present themselves
frcc from human interpretation by creating the image of the painting in the
mind ofthe observer. Heidegger's argument is somewhat weaker in the case
of painting in that the medium of color, unlike the stone of a statue, is not a
piece of equipment and arguably not even a "thing" at all. The important
point, however, is that though an image is created by the various colors in
a painting, the colors themselves do not occupy the observer's conscious
ness. They are simply experienced and laidbare to the observer in their true,
unadulterated nature.
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Keeping Bartky' s linking of earth and medium in mind, one can see
the larger process of self-concealment, or "earth," as being "set forth" and
revealed to the observer in a work of art. As Heidegger claims, "In setting
up a world, the work [of art] sets forth the earth" (OWA,p. 171). World and
earth, though diametrically opposed in their essences, are thus inextricably
linkedina work ofart, and as Heidegger states, "World and earth. " are never
separated. The world grounds itself in the earth, and earth juts through
world" (OW A, p. 172). Heidegger refers to the opposition of the natures of
world and earth as strife and believes that by simultaneously "setting up a
world and setting forth the earth," a work of art instigates this strife (OWA,
p.173).
For Heidegger, truth is "won" by a work of art through the
instigation ofthis strife in that truth in its full sense, as both a revealing and
a concealing, is simultaneously presented to the observer. In a work of art,
not only is a world revealed to the observer, but the self-concealing earth is
revealed as well. Thus, as Heidegger states, in a work ofart, because "beings
as a whole are brought into unconcealedness and held therein, ... the
unconcealedness ofbeings as a whole, or truth, is won" (OWA, p. 177). As
Bartky very eloquently explains, "The struggle of world and earth, of
expression and materials, in the artwork is one way in which the revealing
but simul taneously concealing World-event may occur" (Bartky, p. 267). To
use an example, an image is revealed to the observer of a painting. This
revealing occurs, however, onI y through the observation ofthe colors ofthe
painting. But in experiencing the painting and realizing its image, the
observer is unaware ofthe colors themselves. The colors, though presented
to and experienced by the observer, are concealed to the observer's con
sciousness. Thus, in seeing the image of a painting, the observer simulta
neouslyexperiences a revealing and a concealing. Through this experienc
ing of a revealing and a concealing, truth is not necessarily intellectually
comprehended, but rather, as Heidegger states, truth simply "happens."
Art And Photography

In photography, a simultaneous revealing of a world and setting
forth ofa self-concealing earth also occurs. A photograph reveals a historical
and social world and in so doing presents the observer with the realm of
possible beings and decisions of a particular historical epoch. In Dorothea
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Lange's famous photograph entitled "California," a world is revealed to the
observer (pollack, p. 352). The photograph reveals the world ofthe migrant
fanners in California during the Great Depression in all of its despair and
hopelessness. The power ofthe photograph lies in its ability to transport the
observer into the world of the migrant workers and reveal the realm of that
particular historical epoch in all of its possible beings and decisions. This
revealing of a world, like painting, is also grounded in the medium ofcolor.2
Like the experiencing of the image in a painting, the observer of a photo
graph is unconscious of the colors that comprise the image. The colors of a
photograph, though experienced, are self-concealing. Thus, photography,
like painting, reveals a world by setting forth the self-concealing earth, and
truth "happens" in the Heideggerian sense of the term.
Not only does truth "happen" in photography, but it happens in a
much more effective way than it does in painting. Upon close examination,
the medium rather than the image of a painting can dominate one's
concentration. When one stands very close to a painting, one notices the
cracks due to age or the brush strokes that the painter used, and suddenly the
colors that comprise the image can occupy one's mind. In examining a
painting in such a way, the image created by tlle painting slips into oblivion,
and tlle world created by the painting is transformed in the mind of the
observer into merely an array of various pigments meshed together on a
cloth canvas. The painting simply becomes a self-concealing thing, no
different in nature from the self-concealing frame which surrounds it or the
self-concealing wall upon which it hangs. The world of the painting
disappears and thus the fragile strife between world and earth is broken.
When viewing a photograph, however, while the possibility of
breaking the strife between world and earth cannot be denied, the strife is
much more difficult to break. Upon close examination, the photograph
remains an image and the world revealed by the photograph is not lost. The
fact that the image is merely an array ofdots on photographic paper is almost
impossible to observe from simply looking at the photograph, and the
photograph stubbornly refuses to be seen as anything but the image itself.
This stubbornness ofthe photograph is what one refers to when claiming that
a photograph is "realistic." The strife between world and earth is so acutely
21 am not using the word "color" here to mean the opposite of black and white but rather
simply to mean a visual sensation of some shade of any color including black and white.
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captured by the photograph that the untangling ofthis strife through careful
observation becomes almost impossible. It is true that one could break the
strife by closely observing a photograph through a magnifying glass and
thus uncovering the medium underlying the image. However, much more
effort is needed to break the strife ofa photograph than that ofa painting. An
almost conscious determination to unravel the strife of the photograph is
required. Because of this fact, photography is much more effective than
painting in its ability to maintain the strife that for Heidegger is so necessary
in order for truth to "happen." In this sense, photography is a higher or more
advanced form of art than painting.
One might object to this claim by arguing that a photograph, unlike
a painting, lacks the ability to reveal an object's "equipmental" nature and
thus remains inferior to painting. This objection might stem from Heidegger' s
claim that the act of imagining or seeing an actual object can in no way
capture what he calls the "equipmental being of the equipment." Heidegger
believes, however, that by observing a painting such as Van Gogh's
depiction of a pair of peasant's shoes, one can come to experience the full
equipmental being of an object in its myriad of uses. Heidegger describes
Van Gogh's peasant's shoes as follows:
From the dark opening ofthe worn insides ofthe shoes the
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly
rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated
tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and
ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by raw wind. On
the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under
the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening
falls (OWA, p. 163).
Thus, in his depiction of the shoes, Van Gogh's creative freedom allows him
to emphasize or add certain qualities of the shoes and thus reveal their full
equipmental being in a way that would be impossible by simply presenting
the observer with an actual pair of peasant's shoes. By claiming that
photographs are mirror images or copies of actual objects, one could thus
conclude that photographs, like the objects themselves, cannot reveal an
object's true equipmental nature.
This objection, however, is based upon the false assumption that
equates the photographic image with the object itself, an assumption that
simply disregards the creative freedom of the photographer. By placing
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photographed objects in certain contexts and under certain lighting condi
tions, the photographer also exercises the artistic freedom which allows him
or her to capture the full equipmental nature ofequipment. A good example
ofthis freedom is exhibited in Andr6 Kert6sz' s depiction ofa pipe (Kert6sz,
Plate # 71). In the photograph, Kert6sz captures the simplicity and grace of
the pipe's equipmental nature by placing it in a context which evokes in the
mind ofthe observer the pipe's various uses. 'The glasses just below the pipe
reveal the smoking of the pipe in a time of study or contemplation while the
overtumedglassestotheleftrevealthecomfortaffordedbythepipeinatime
of worry or distress. The careful positioning ofthe pipe in the bowl suggests
the pipe as a status symbol, a sign of education and wealth and the source of
pride in the mind of its owner. Thus, the photograph does not simply reveal
an actuall y present pipe to the observer. Rather, the photograph, like Van
Gogh's painting. captures the observer's imagination ofthe pipe in a myriad
of uses and significations and consequently reveals the equipmental being
of the pipe.
Photography And Technology

While Heidegger does not himself directly address the issue of
photography. Michael Zimmerman argues that Heidegger believes photog
raphy to be an expression of the false notion ofthe modern era that humans
are the ultimate ground ofreality. Zimmerman claims that Heidegger chose
the title "The Age of the World-Picture" with both film and photography in
mind. In the modern age, Heidegger believes that humans, or what he calls
"Dasein," view objects as being dependent upon themselves in order to
exist. As Heidegger states, "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a
way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up
by Dasein, who represents and sets forth" (HeideggerinZimmerman, p. 87).
Accordingto Heidegger, instead of letting objects Be and experiencing them
in their true sense, the modern outlook places humans within any world
picture and consequently fails to recognize lhe fundamental ground of
beings in Being.
Zimmerman argues that Heidegger thinks that photography is an
aspect of what Zimmerman calls "the technological drive to make every
thing wholly present, unconcealed, available for use" (Zimmerman, p. 86).
According to Zimmerman, the camera has a "point of view" which is, as
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Zimmerman states, "the position taken on things for the purpose of making
them reveal themselves in ways satisfactory to the one doing the re
presenting" (Zimmerman, p. 87). Thus, Zimmerman claims that Heidegger
believes photography to be the epitome of the modem mind-set The
photographerpicks and chooses his orher reality as heor she sees fit. Reality
is viewed as a ready-made object, and in deciding what to photograph, the
photographer chooses which reality he or she should recreate. The reality
presented in the photograph is thus dependent upon the photographer's
discretion, and this subject-dependent view ofreality reflects the very mind
set of modernity that wrongly assumes that human consciousness is the
fundamental ground for the existence of other beings. Thus, according to
Zimmerman, Heidegger argues that the subject-dependent perspective of
photography ignores the truth that all beings, including Dasein, are ulti
mately grounded in Being (Zimmerman, p. 87).
Heidegger's argument, however, irOnically stems from the failure
to view photography in light of Heidegger's own vision of technology}
Heidegger believes that in the modern, technological age, Dasein has
become estranged from its essence as the thatness ofBeing. Dasein views
reality as a commodity at its disposal, and Heidegger refers to reality
regarded as a commodity by the term "standing reserve." When reality is
treated by Dasein as "standing reserve," Dasein sees the existence of reality
as being dependent upon its own existence. Thus, as Heidegger states, in the
current technological age, humans have lost touch with the truth that their
essence is grounded in Being because "it seems as though [humans]
everywhere and always encounter only [themselves]" (QCT, p. 308).
The solution, for Heidegger, is not to forsake technology but rather
to adopt a new mind-set towards technology. Dasein must realize that it is
Being and not Dasein's own creative resourcefulness that is the ultimate
driving force behind the emergence of technology. Rather than regarding
"technology as an instrument" by which Dasein has ingeniously gained
control over its environment, Heidegger believes that Dasein must view
technology as "the destining of a revealing" (QCT, p. 314). Technology is
destined by Being as a way in which Being reveals itself to Dasein. Only by
conceiving technology in this way can Dasein transcend the anthropocentric
3 By calling the argument against photography "Heidegger's argument," I am assuming
that Zimmerman's presentation of Heidegger's views on photography is accurate.
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view that it is the ultimate source of technology and that world is merely a
ready-made "standing reserve" awaiting human conunand. With a different
outlook toward technology, Dasein will retain its essence as grounded in
Being without having to completely forsake the revealing of Being as well
as the many practical benefits that technology provides.
Paradoxically, if one applies this conception of technology to
photography, Heidegger's argument that photography epitomizes the an
thropocentric mind-set of the modem age appears misleading. By adopting
Heidegger's notion that technology is the destined revealing of Being. the
camera is no longer viewed as an aspect of human genius by which human
beings have mastered the ability to re-create reality. Rather, the camera's
ground in Being is recognized. The camera is viewed as being destined by
Being to reveal Being. Seen in such a manner, the photograph is not the
recreation of reality by human beings. On the contrary, the photograph, in
its essence, is produced by Being in that it is destined by Being. It can not
be denied that humans play a role in producing the camera as well as the
photograph, and Heidegger does not ignore the fact that humans, or Dasein
as the "thatness of Being," are essential for the revealing of being to occur.
However, Heidegger believes that Dasein and consequently the products of
Dasein are ultimately grounded in Being. While it is true that a photographer
selects the aspect of reality of which he or she takes a photograph, this
selecting should not be equated with the creation of a reality. On the
contrary, the selecting of an object to photograph should be viewed as being
similar to what occurs when a painter decides upon the subject ofhis or her
painting. The photographer selects but does not create, and the distinction
between the two concepts is critical in avoiding Heidegger's misconception
about photography.
Conclusion
Many would agree that photography has had a profound impact on
the history of painting, but probably few would recognize the fact that
photography has in fact rendered painting obsolete as aform of art. Now that
reality can be so effectively represented by the photograph. modern painting
has begun exploring different and more abstract ways of representing'
reality. Viewing art in the Heideggerian sense, one could argue that these
new directions which painting has taken represent the confusion of painters
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trying to salvage what remains of their archaic mode of representation now
that its viability has been so completely shattered by the development of
photography. Indeed, as Zimmerman indicates, Heidegger argues that
modem painting in all of its concern with subjective interpretation is the
unfortunate expression of the anthropocentric mind-set of the modern,
technological era (Zimmerman, p. 237). What Heidegger does not seem to
realize is that painting has not merely gone astray, but rather that it has been
superseded by an art form which is far superior in its ability to capture the
essence oftruth. Not only would a new conception of technology make this
fact more obvious, but conversel y, through an understanding of the essence
of photography as art, one may be making the first steps toward the new
conception of technology that Heidegger believes to be so essential in
Dasein's overcoming its estrangement from Being.
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